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Abstract
 
-
 
The Internet Threat Monitoring (ITM),is a globally scoped Internet monitoring system whose 
goal is to measure, detect, characterize, and track threats such as distribute denial of service(DDoS) 
attacks and worms. To block the monitoring system in the internet the attackers are targeted the ITM 
system. In this paper we address flooding attack against ITM system in which the attacker attempt to 
exhaust the network and ITM’s resources, such as network bandwidth, computing power, or operating 
system data structures by sending the malicious traffic. We propose an information-theoretic frame work 
that models the flooding attacks using Botnet on ITM.we propose a novel group testing (GT)-based 
approach deployed on back-end servers, which not only offers a theoretical method to obtain short 
detection delay and low false positive/negative rate, but also provides an underlying framework against 
general network attacks.
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Modeling and Counter Measures of Flooding 
Attacks to Internet Threat Monitors (ITM): Using 
Botnet and Group-Testing approach 
Abstract - The Internet Threat Monitoring (ITM),is a globally 
scoped Internet monitoring system whose goal is to measure, 
detect, characterize, and track threats such as distribute denial 
of service(DDoS) attacks and worms. To block the monitoring 
system in the internet the attackers are targeted the ITM 
system. In this paper we address flooding attack against ITM 
system in which the attacker attempt to exhaust the network 
and ITM’s resources, such as network bandwidth, computing 
power, or operating system data structures by sending the 
malicious traffic. We propose an information-theoretic frame 
work that models the flooding attacks using Botnet on ITM.we 
propose a novel group testing (GT)-based approach deployed 
on back-end servers, which not only offers a theoretical 
method to obtain short detection delay and low false 
positive/negative rate, but also provides an underlying 
framework against general network attacks. 
General Terms : Computer networks, network security, 
Attacks and Internet. 
Keywords : Internet Threat Monitors (ITM), DDoS, 
Flooding attack, Botnet and Honeypot, Group testing. 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
nternet security is increasing in importance. Yet, 
despite decades of research, we are still unable to 
make secure computer networks. Further, more 
sophisticated and new attacks are expected to continue 
posing a greater degree of threat to Internet services. As 
a result, a more fundamental model, in terms of 
theoretical and system perspectives, regardless of 
attack types must be investigated. An essential problem 
to overcome for any defense mechanism is the fact that 
malicious traffic/packets can be similar to legitimate 
ones. 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a major security 
problem in computer systems and networks. In a DoS 
attack, a group of attackers try to make a service 
unavailable to legitimate clients for unacceptably long 
periods of time. Service-level DoS attacks target server 
resources by issuing legitimate-like service requests at a 
high rate to overwhelm the victim servers. These attacks, 
attempt to exhaust the victim’s resources, such as 
network bandwidth, computing power, or operating 
system data structures. Flood attack, Ping of Death 
attack, SYN attack, Teardrop attack, DDoS , and Smurf  
  
   
   
 
attack are the most common types of DoS attacks. The 
hackers who launch DDoS attacks typically target sites 
or services provided by high-profile organizations, such 
as government agencies, banks, credit-card payment 
gateways, and even root name servers. 
A flooding-based Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack is a very common way to attack a victim 
machine by sending a large amount of unwanted traffic. 
Network level congestion control can throttle peak traffic 
to protect the network. Network monitors are used to 
monitor the traffic in the networks to classify them as 
genuine or attack traffic and also these monitors gives 
the traffic as an input to several DDoS detection 
algorithms for detection of DDoS attacks.  However, it 
cannot stop the quality of service (QoS) for legitimate 
traffic from going down because of attacks. Two 
features of DDoS attacks hinder the advancement of 
defense techniques. First, it is hard to distinguish 
between DDoS attack traffic and normal traffic. There is 
a lack of an effective differentiation mechanism that 
results in minimal collateral damage for legitimate traffic. 
Second, the sources of DDoS attacks are also difficult to 
find in a distributed environment. Therefore, it is difficult 
to stop a DDoS attack effectively.  
The Internet Threat Monitoring (ITM) System 
basically has two main components one is centralized 
data center and another is the number of monitors 
which are distributed across the Internet. Each monitor 
covers the range of IP addresses and monitors the 
traffic to send the traffic logs to data center. The data 
center now collects the traffic logs from monitors and 
analyzes the collected traffic logs to publish reports to 
ITM system users. 
            The collected logs, as a random sample of the 
Internet traffic, can still provide critical insights for the 
public to measure, characterize, and track/detect 
Internet security threats. The idea of ITM systems dates 
back to DShield and CAIDA network telescope [4], [5], 
which have been successfully used to analyze the 
activities of worms and DDoS attacks [3], [6].The reason 
is that if an attacker discovers the monitor locations, it 
can easily avoid detection (by ITM systems) by 
bypassing the monitored IP addresses and directing the 
attack to the much larger space of unmonitored IP 
addresses. Furthermore, such an attacker may even 
mislead the reports published by an ITM system by 
I 
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manipulating traffic to the identified monitors, generating 
highly skewed samples. Since ITM reports are trusted 
by the public as a random (unbiased) sample of Internet 
traffic, the confidentiality of monitor locations is vital for 
the usability of ITM systems. 
The monitor locations of an ITM system can be 
compromised by introducing several attacks by the 
attackers which includes Localization attacks [1] and 
DDoS Attacks which exploits some vulnerability or 
implementation bug in the software implementation of a 
service to bring that down or that use up all the available 
resources at the target machine or that consume all the 
bandwidth available to the victim machine, this is called 
as Bandwidth attacks.  
The main goal of our work is to perform the 
identification of attackers much faster by testing them in 
group instead of one by one. This will help to detect the 
flooding attacks, So that if any ITM is found under 
attack, we can immediately identify and filter the 
attackers out of its client set. Apparently, this problem 
resembles the group testing (GT) theory [14] which aims 
to discover defective items in a large population with the 
minimum number of tests where each test is applied to 
a subset of items, called pools, instead of testing them 
one by one. Therefore, we apply GT theory to this 
network security issue and propose specific algorithms 
and protocols to achieve high detection performance in 
terms of short detection latency and low false 
positive/negative rate.  
In this paper we introduce an information 
theoretic frame work model to existing flooding attacks 
on ITM system monitors. In the flooding attack the 
attacker sends the large volume of unwanted traffic to 
the targeted monitor by using the botnet or huge 
number of compromised systems. Based on the 
Information-theoretic model we propose a Group 
Testing based approach to detect flooding attacks. 
II.     RELATED WORK 
Probing traffic based Localization attack [7][8] 
in which an attacker sends high rate short length port 
scan messages to the targeted network to compromise 
the monitor locations in ITM system. Then, attacker 
queries the data center to determine whether a short 
spike of high-rate traffic appears in the queried time-
series data, for confirmation of the attack. 
A steganographic localization attack [9] an 
attacker launches a stream of low-rate port-scan 
probing traffic which is marginally modulated by a secret 
Pseudonoise (PN) code. While the low-rate property 
prevents the exhibition of obvious regularity of the 
published traffic data at the data center, based on the 
carefully synchronized PN code, the attacker can still 
accurately identify the PN-code-modulated traffic in the 
retrieved published traffic data from the data center. 
Thereby, the existence of monitors in the targeted 
network can be compromised. To this end, the PN-
code-based steganographic attack presented in our 
paper can be understood as a covert channel problem 
[10], because the attack traffic encoded by a signal 
blends into the background traffic and is only 
recognizable by the attacker which knows the secret 
pattern of the PN code.
 In [1] introduced the information theoretic 
framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
localization attacks by using the minimum time length 
required by an attacker to achieve a predefined 
detection rate as the metric. But this frame work is 
defined in specific to the localization attacks only; they 
are not given any solution for other DDoS attacks. The 
frame work allows the ITMs which are registered within 
the data center given, and the access is restricted to 
that private region only. But public access of the ITMs 
and data center allows more scope to provide security 
against different attacks.
 Group Testing (GT) based approach [17] is 
used to detect the application denial of service attacks, 
there the efficiency of the attack detection is improved 
by testing the traffic by group instead of one by one. The 
GT approach also minimizes the false positives and 
false negatives comparatively to the input traffic. But the 
GT approach can be applied to the DDoS detection 
whenever the number of attackers known in advance.
This assumption will not be suitable for all DDoS 
attacks.
 III.     PROPOSED WORK
 In [1] the authors define a model in which the 
ITMs
 
in the networks sends the traffic logs periodically 
to the data center and the data center collects the traffic 
logs and publishes the reports to ITM
 
system users 
which are registered, that means it creates the private 
environment or region .In the private region the scope 
for DDoS
 
attacks are very less, and they are restricted 
this model only for Localization attacks. In this section
 we have defined a model which will provide the following 
extensions.
 Public accessing
 
: Public accessing of the data 
center increases the network usage and provides better 
communication with the outside world rather than private 
environment. In this any user from outside the private 
region can get the communication with the private 
network, if the user is genuine he can get the status of 
the monitor before sending the data to internal monitors, 
to avoid the attacks. If the user is an attacker, then this 
status information can be misused to perform the 
attacks on the monitor. The data center sends the status 
information to any users (public or private) based on the 
request query, but the private (internal) users can get 
the highest priority.
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Usage of Botnets for Flooding Attack : A denial-
of-service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt by 
attackers to prevent an information service’s legitimate 
users from using that service. In a DDoS attack, these 
  
 
 
attempts come from a large number of distributed hosts 
that coordinate to flood the victim with an abundance of 
attack packets simultaneously. The attacker may use the 
botnets [11], [12] and other alternatives to launch the 
attack. 
 
a)
 
Flooding
 
Launching a flooding attack
 
:  Once the DDoS
 
network has been set up and the infrastructure for 
communication between the agents and the handlers 
established, all that an attacker needs to do is to issue 
commands to the agents to start sending packets to the 
victim host. The agents try to send unusual data packets 
(all TCP
 
flags set, repeated TCP SYN packets, Large 
ICMP
 
packets) to maximize the possibility of causing 
disruption at the victim and the intermediate nodes. 
There are certain basic packet attack types which are 
favorites of the attack tool designers. All the attack tools 
use a combination of these packet attack types to 
launch a DDoS
 
attack. The basic attack types are
 
i.
 
TCP
 
floods
 
: A stream of packets with various flags
 
(SYN,RST, ACK) are sent to the victim machine. 
The TCP SYN flood works by exhausting the TCP
 
connection queue of the host and thus denying 
legitimate connection requests. TCP ACK
 
floods 
can cause disruption at the nodes corresponding to 
the host addresses of the floods as well. Also the 
one known tool that uses TCP ACK
 
flooding 
(mstream [13]) has been
 
known to cause 
disruptions in a router even with a moderate packet 
rate. Both TCP SYN flooding and the mstream 
attack constitute a group of attacks known as 
asymmetric attacks (Attacks where a less powerful 
system can render a much more powerful system 
useless). 
 
ii.
 
ICMP
 
floods (e.g ping floods)
 
: A stream of ICMP
 
packets is sent to the victim host. A variant of the 
ICMP
 
floods is the Smurf attack in which a spoofed 
IP packet consisting of an ICMP ECHO_REQUEST
 
is sent to a directed broadcast address. The RFC
 
for ICMP
 
specifies that no ECHO_REPLY packets 
should be generated for broadcast addresses, but 
unfortunately many operating systems and router 
vendors have failed to incorporate this into their 
implementations. As a result, the victim host (in this 
case the machine whose IP
 
address was spoofed 
by the attacker) receives ICMP ECHO_REPLY 
packets from all the hosts on the network and can 
easily crash under such loads. Such networks are 
known as amplifier networks and thousands of such 
networks have been documented.
 
iii. UDP floods
 
:  A  huge  amount of UDP
 
packets are 
sent to the victim host. Trinoo is a popular DDoS
 
tool that uses UDP
 
floods as one of its attack 
payloads.
 
b)
 
Bots
 
Studying the evolution of bots and botnets 
provides insight into their current capabilities. One of the 
original uses of computer bots was to assist in Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) channel management [14]. IRC
 
is a 
chat system that provides one-to-one and one-to-many 
instant messaging over the Internet. Users can join a 
named channel on an IRC
 
network and communicate 
with groups of other users. Administering busy chat 
channels can be time consuming, and so channel 
operators created bots to help manage the operation of 
popular channels. One of the first bots was Eggdrop, 
which was written in 1993
 
to assist channel operators 
[1].
 
In time, IRC
 
bots with more nefarious purposes 
emerged. The goal of these bots was to attack other 
IRC
 
users and IRC
 
servers. These attacks often involved 
flooding the target with packets (i.e., DoS attacks). The 
use of bots helped to hide the attacker because the 
attack packets were sent from the bot rather than 
directly from the attacker (assuming a non-spoofed 
attack). This new level of indirection also allowed 
multiple computers to be grouped together to perform 
distributed attacks (DDoS)
 
and bring down bigger 
targets. Larger targets required more bots, and so 
attackers looked for methods to recruit new members. 
Since very few users would agree to have their 
computers utilized for conducting packet floods, 
attackers used
 
trojaned files and other surreptitious 
methods to infect other computers.
 
c)
 
IRC-
 
based Command and Control
 
A bot must communicate with a controller to 
receive commands or send back information. One 
method for establishing a communication channel is to 
connect directly to the controller. The problem is that 
this connection could compromise the controller’s 
location. Instead, the bot controller can use a proxy 
such as public message drop point (e.g., a well-known 
message board). However, because websites and other 
drop points can introduce significant communication 
latency, a more active approach is desirable. A well-
known public exchange point that enables virtually 
instant communication is IRC.
 
IRC
 
provides a common protocol that is widely 
deployed across the Internet and has simple text-based 
command syntax. There is also a large number of 
existing IRC
 
networks that can be used as public 
exchange points. In addition, most IRC
 
networks lack 
any strong authentication, and a number of tools to 
provide anonymity on IRC
 
networks are available. Thus, 
IRC
 
provides a simple, low-latency, widely available, 
and anonymous command and control channel for 
botnet communication. An IRC
 
network is composed of 
one or more IRC
 
servers as depicted in Figure 1.
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In a typical botnet, each bot connects to a 
public IRC network or a hidden IRC server on another 
compromised system. The bot then enters a named 
channel and can receive commands directly from a 
controller or even from sequences encoded into the title 
of the channel. 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
d)
 
Group Testing
 
The first application of group testing was during 
WWII; instead of testing every blood sample 
individually, groups of samples were pooled together 
and tested collectively. If the outcome of the group test 
is negative, all samples in the group are good (disease-
free). Although group testing has been used since
 
then 
in many security and networking applications, such as 
data forensics, cryptography, multiple-access channels, 
and broadcast security against jamming, our work is the 
first to apply this powerful theory to the DoS
 
attack 
problem.
 
Group testing aims mainly at identifying the 
defective (special) members of a population with few 
tests. There are two classes of group-testing 
mechanisms. “Non-adaptive”, or single-stage, specifies 
all tests simultaneously without the benefit of using the 
outcomes of previous
 
tests to determine the present 
test. Adaptive (multi-stage) group testing uses feedback 
from previous test results to determine subsequent 
tests.
 
  
 
 
 
 
ii.
 
Detection of defective members
 
The detection algorithm discovers the defective 
members using the result vector and Members Test 
(defectives underlined) Results. An example of a group-
testing matrix. the matrix. The algorithm we use in this 
paper works by excluding a negative (non-defective) 
member if it participates in a “large enough” number of 
tests with a negative result. For instance, if we assume 
that a member has to participate in only one negative 
test to be excluded, then in the above example; 
members 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10 will be excluded. This 
leaves us with the defective members 2, 6, and 8 as 
suspects. In this specific example, all defective elements 
are detected, and all non-defective members are 
cleared.
 
iii.
 
Apply to Attack Detection
 
A detection model based on GT
 
can be 
assumed that there are T
 
virtual servers and N
 
clients, 
among which d clients are attackers shown in fig. 
Consider the matrix M
 
,the clients can be mapped 
into the columns and virtual servers into rows in M, 
where M [i,j]=1 if and only if the requests from client j
 
are distributed to virtual server i. With regard to the test 
outcome column V, we have V [i]=1
 
if and only if virtual 
server i
 
has received malicious requests from at least 
one attacker, but we cannot identify the attackers at 
once unless this virtual server is handling only one client. 
Otherwise, if V [i]=0, all the clients assigned to server i 
are legitimate. The d
 
attackers can then be captured by 
decoding the test outcome vector V
 
and the matrix M.
 
iv.
 
False Positive and False Negative Probabilities
 
 
A false positive is when a non-defective 
member gets falsely identified as defective, while a false 
negative is when a defective member ends up being not 
detected. In the example above, both the false positive 
probability and the false negative probability are 0. In 
general, simple detection algorithm discussed above 
detects all defective members with the false positive 
probability
 
FP = [1−p(1−p)d]T ,
 
Where d
 
is the number of defective members in 
the group and T
 
is the number of tests used to detect 
defective members. By differentiating the above 
equation with respect to p, the optimal value of p, the 
value that yields the minimum false positive probability, 
Modeling and Counter Measures of Flooding Attacks to Internet Threat Monitors (ITM): Using Botnet 
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is 1/d+1. Thus, the minimum false positive probability for 
a given number of tests T is:
Finally, from Eqn. 1 we derive the number of 
tests, Tfp, required to achieve a target false positive 
probability fp:
i.    Basic Idea
The basic group testing is modeled as a T × N 
matrix, where N is the total number of members, and T
is the number of tests. Matrix rows represent tests and 
columns represent group members. When a matrix 
element (i, j) is set to 1, this means that member j 
participates in test i. An example of a group testing 
matrix for a population of 10 members with 4 tests is 
shown in Figure 1. Test results are represented as a 
vector with an element for each test. For simplicity we 
assume that the test results are binary. So, a test result 
is set to 1 if the corresponding test returns a positive 
result, that is, if the test was applied to a group with at 
least one defective member. In the example shown in 
Figure 1 the 2nd, 6th, and 8th members are defective.
Figure 1 : Compromised computers. In a distributed 
denial-of-service attack (DDoS), these computers serve 
three major roles: master controller, command and 
control server, and bot.
txn
  
 
 
 
As we will show later, Tfp
 
is O(d), that is, the 
number of tests is in the order of number of defective 
members attackers) not the total number of members 
(N). 
 
The false negative probability is
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2 : Work flow of flooding attacks using botnet. 
 
Where ῤattack refers the the probability of 
attack and d is the expected number of attackers.
 
 
IV.      PROPOSED MODEL
 
In this paper we divided the entire model into 
two regions namely private region and public region. 
The Internet Threat Monitors (ITM) are distributed 
across the Internet and each monitor records the traffic 
addressed to range of IP addresses and send the traffic 
logs periodically to the data center. The data center then 
analyzes the traffic logs collected from the monitors and 
publishes the reports to ITM
 
system users. The 
collection of monitors under the data center forms the 
private region because the ITMs
 
are registered before 
sending the logs to the data center. Any user can get 
the reports of the requested ITM
 
by sending the query 
request to the data center and the data center is 
answerable to all the ITMs
 
which are registered.
 
The public region of our
 
model specifies the 
unregistered users of the data center who does not have 
any permission to access the data center, but they can 
get the traffic reports related to any ITM
 
by sending the 
query request to the data center. The data center scope 
is extended to the public domain but it can only give the 
traffic reports to the public users. Allowing the public 
users or network accessing to the data center and 
monitors, causes decrease in the performance because 
of the overload of the data center. These can be
 
balanced by introducing the priorities to the users; the 
internal or private region users have the highest priority 
than the public users .This priorities does not disturb the 
existing scenario but this can enhance the service to the 
public domain ,this will not be a over burden to the data 
center.
 
In This section we are constructing the botnet 
as the public user network without having any 
registration with data center and performing the flooding 
attack on the ITM
 
which is local to the data center. 
 
i.
 
Generation of flooding attack with Botnet
 
             A DDoS
 
(Flooding) attack mechanism typically 
includes a network of several compromised computers 
[15]. These compromised computers serve three major 
role -master controller, command and control (C&C)
 
server,
 
and bot. An attacker prepares a DDoS
 
attack by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in one computer system and 
making it the DDoS
 
“master controller.” From here, the 
attacker identifies and communicates with other 
Modeling and Counter Measures of Flooding Attacks to Internet Threat Monitors (ITM): Using Botnet 
and Group-Testing approach
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compromised systems. A C&C server is a compromised 
host with a special program running on it, this server 
distributes instructions from the attacker to the rest of 
the bots, which form a botnet[11]. (A bot is a 
compromised host that runs a special program.) Each 
C&C server is capable of controlling multiple bots, each 
of which is responsible for generating a stream of 
packets to the intended victim. Often, the bots 
employed to send the flood of requests are infected with 
a virus that lets attackers use them anonymously. 
A Flooding attack happens in several phases : 
• Discover vulnerable hosts. To launch a DDoS 
attack, attackers first build a network of computers 
that they can use to produce the volume of traffic 
needed to deny services to legitimate users. To 
create this network, they first scan and identify 
vulnerable sites or hosts. Vulnerable hosts are 
usually those that run either no antivirus software or 
an out-of-date version, or those that aren’t properly 
patched. Attackers use these compromised hosts 
for further scanning and compromises. 
• Establish a botnet. After gaining access, attacker 
must then install attack tools on the compromised 
hosts to form a botnet.  
• Launch an attack. In the next phase, attackers send 
commands to C&C servers for their bots to attack 
by sending hundreds of thousands of requests to 
the target simultaneously.  
• Flood a target. In the final phase, monitor receives a 
flood of requests to the point where they can’t 
operate effectively.  
ii. Conformation of attack 
The attacker queries the data center for the 
traffic reports. Such traffic reflects both flooding 
requests traffic and other traffic collected from all 
monitors. Then the attacker confirms the attack by 
checking the status of the ITM in the traffic reports 
published by the data center. 
V.    PREVENTION 
Preventive mechanisms attempt either to 
reduce the possibility of DDoS attacks or enable 
potential victims to endure the attack without denying 
services to legitimate users. 
• System security mechanisms increase a host’s 
overall security posture and prevent it from 
becoming part of a botnet or a DDoS victim. 
Examples of system security mechanisms include 
reliable firewall filtering, proper system 
configuration, effective vulnerability management, 
timely patch installation, robust antivirus programs, 
controlled and monitored system access, and solid 
instruction detection. 
• Resource multiplication mechanisms provide an 
abundance of resources to counter DDoS threats, 
such as increasing the capacity of network 
bandwidth, routers, firewalls, and servers. Additional 
examples include deploying information services at 
diverse network locations and establishing clusters 
of servers with load-balancing capabilities. 
Resource multiplication essentially raises the bar on 
how many bots must participate in an attack to be 
effective. While not providing perfect protection, this 
last approach has often proved sufficient for small- 
to mid-range DDoS attacks. 
Preventing Flooding Attacks  
In this section we introduce a general 
methodology to prevent flooding attacks. It is based on 
the following line of reasoning: 
1) To mount a successful Flooding attack, a large 
number of compromised machines are necessary. 
2) To coordinate a large number of machines, the 
attacker needs a remote control mechanism. 
3) If the remote control mechanism is disabled, the 
Flooding attack is prevented. 
           Our methodology to mitigate flooding attacks 
aims at manipulating the root-cause of the attacks, i.e., 
influencing the remote control network. Our approach is 
based on three steps: 
1. Infiltrating the remote control network. 
2. Analyzing the network in detail. 
3. Shutting down the remote control network. 
In the first step, we have to find a way to 
smuggle an agent into the control network. In this 
context, the term agent describes a general procedure 
to mask as a valid member of the control network. This 
agent must thus be customized to the type of network 
we want to plant it in. The level of adaptation to a real 
member of the network depends on the target we want 
to infiltrate. For instance, to infiltrate a botnet we would 
try to simulate a valid bot, maybe even emulating some 
bot commands. 
Once we are able to sneak an agent into the 
remote control network, it enables us to perform the 
second step, i.e., to observe the network in detail. So we 
can start to monitor all activity and analyze all 
information we have collected. 
In the last step, we use the collected information 
to shut down the remote control network. Once this is 
done, we have deprived the attacker’s control over the 
other machines and thus efficiently stopped the threat of 
a flooding attack with this network. Again, the particular 
way in which the network is shut down depends on the 
type of network. 
VI.    DETECTION OF FLOODING ATTACKS 
In this section we present efficient way of 
detecting the attacks on the ITMs in the given 
information theoretic frame work. We divide the attack 
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detection process into two phases, Firstly the primary 
detection of DDoS attacks on the ITMs and the later is 
the detection of flooding attacks on the ITMs. 
In the primary detection phases the system 
detects the attacks based on traffic information 
aggregated from all monitors in the ITM system. If the 
overall traffic rate (e.g., volume in a given time interval) 
exceeds a predetermined threshold, the defender issues 
an alarm. The threshold value can be maintained either 
at data center or the individual ITMs based on the type 
of schemes used [1] in the network.In the primary 
detection phase the system detects some attack was 
happened in the network. If the detection scheme is 
centralized, then whenever the aggregate traffic exceeds 
the threshold maintained at the data center then the 
data center finds the attack and that attacked monitor 
can be identified by verifying the individual traffic logs of 
each ITM from the report. Otherwise if the detection 
strategy is distributed then each monitor maintained an 
individual threshold and checked the aggregate traffic 
regularly. If the traffic exceeds the threshold then it find 
the attack was happened and sends the status as 
attacked to the data center. After getting the attacked 
status from the ITM the data center blocks the 
corresponding ITM and displays the status of the ITM 
as blocked in the status reports, which will avoids the 
further traffic to or from the attacked ITM with the rest of 
the networks. 
The second stage of detection specifies the 
detection of the flooding attacks. Once the attack is 
conformed then the data center identifies the attacked 
monitor and the traffic logs will be handover to the 
flooding detection phase. The flooding detection phase 
then performs the group testing (GT) on the traffic, then 
identifies the attackers from the client traffic set. 
In this section we define group testing (GT) 
based DDoS detection methods for flooding detection 
on ITMs in information frame work defined, and also 
detection of false positives and false negatives in the 
network for large flow size.  
a) BOTNET Detection 
Botnets are a very real and quickly evolving 
problem that is still not well understood. In this paper, 
we outline the problem and investigate methods of 
stopping bots. We identify three approaches for 
handling botnets:  
1) Prevent systems from being infected, 
2) Directly detect command and control 
communication among bots and between bots and 
controllers, and, 
3) Detect the secondary features of a bot infection 
such as propagation or attacks. 
The first approach is to prevent systems from 
being infected. There are a range of existing techniques, 
including anti-virus software, firewalls, and automatic 
patching. 
The second approach is to directly detect 
botnet command and control traffic. Botnets today are 
often controlled using Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and one 
possible method of detecting IRC-based botnets is to 
monitor TCP port 6667 which is the standard port used 
for IRC traffic. One could also look for non-human 
behavioral characteristics in traffic, or even build IRC 
server scanners to identify potential botnets.  
We argue there is also a third approach that 
detects botnets by identifying secondary features of a 
bot infection such as propagation or attack behavior. 
Rather than directly attempting to find command and 
control traffic, the key to this approach is the correlation 
of data from different sources to locate bots and 
discover command and control connections. 
In this paper we investigate the second 
approach for stopping botnets. The problem with the 
first approach is that preventing all systems on the 
Internet from being infected is nearly an impossible 
challenge. As a result, there will be large pools of 
vulnerable systems connected to the Internet for many 
years to come. 
b) Detecting Command and Control 
To combat the growing problem of bots, we 
identified two approaches for detecting botnets: detect 
the command and control communication, or detect the 
secondary features of a bot infection. In this section we 
study methods of detecting botnets by directly locating 
command and control traffic. 
i. IRC-based Botnet Detection 
Today, most known bots use IRC as a 
communication protocol, and there are several 
characteristics of IRC that can be leveraged to detect 
bots. One of the simplest methods of detecting IRC-
based botnets is to offramp traffic from a live network on 
known IRC ports (e.g., TCP port 6667) and then 
inspects the payloads for strings that match known 
botnet commands. Unfortunately, botnets can run on 
non-standard ports. Another method is to look for 
behavioral characteristics of bots. One study found that 
bots on IRC were idle most of the time and would 
respond faster than a human upon receiving a 
command. The system they designed looked for these 
characteristics in Netflow traffic and attempted to tag 
certain connections as potential bots [15]. 
The approach was successful in detecting idle 
IRC activity but suffered from a high false positive rate. 
Given problems such as false positives on live networks, 
another approach is to use a non-productive resource or 
honeypot. 
One group set up a vulnerable system and 
waited for it to be infected with a bot. They then located 
outgoing connections to IRC networks and used their 
own bot to connect back and profile the IRC server [16]. 
However, they did not take the next step and develop a 
detection system based on the technique.  
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Rather than connecting to the IRC server 
directly, another approach is to use a honeypot to catch 
the bot and then look for characteristics of command 
and control traffic in the outgoing connections. We 
located all successful outgoing TCP connections and 
verified that they were all directly related to command 
and control activity by inspecting the payloads. There 
were a wide range of interesting behaviors, including 
connections from the bot to search engines to locate 
and use bandwidth testers, downloading posts from 
popular message boards to get server addresses, and 
the transmission of comprehensive host profiles to other 
servers.  
These profiles included detailed information on 
the operating system, host bandwidth, users, 
passwords, file shares, filenames and permissions for all 
files, and a number of other minute details about the 
infected host. 
We then analyzed all successful outgoing 
connections and looked for specific characteristics that 
could be used to identify botnet command and control 
traffic. The results suggested that there are no simple 
characteristics of the communication channels 
themselves that can be used for detection. For example, 
the length of the outgoing connections varied widely, 
with certain connections lasting more then 9 hours and 
others less than a second. 
The number of bytes transferred per connection 
also varied widely even when we separated out IRC 
communication from other command and control 
activity. The results from our analysis nor the results 
from previous bot detection efforts has revealed any 
simple connection-based invariants useful for network 
detection. One might inspect every payload of every 
packet however this is currently very costly on high 
throughput networks. More importantly, attackers can 
make small modifications that make detection nearly 
impossible. 
ii.  
Efficiency : The efficiency of the detection 
system is depends on the number of honeypots placed 
in the network. If one honeypot is used to perform the 
detection in centralized approach, then more than one 
ITM is attacked automatically the honeypot will be 
overloaded and it takes more time to detect the 
attackers. Otherwise if the detection system is 
distributed, then the efficiency of the detection system is 
improved, but it is very much cost effective, practically 
not possible for the large networks. 
In GT approach the detection process can be 
carried out only at data center by collecting the traffic 
logs from the attacked ITM through data center same 
as the centralized detection of the honeypot approach. 
Unlike honeypot detection, the efficiency of the 
detection process does not depend on the traffic 
because huge amount of traffic also processed in terms 
of pools in the GT approach and handled successfully. 
The pools or groups can be as inputs for multiple 
rounds of different tests in GT approach to check for 
different anomalies in the input malicious traffic. 
Reliability : One honeypot for each ITM 
approach is reliable but it is practically very difficult to 
manage and maintained. If the centralized honeypot 
compromises then total detection process will be 
vanished. 
The reliability of the GT approach depends on 
the groups or pools of the malicious traffic considered 
as the input for the GT approach. The number of tests 
performed on the traffic improves the detection 
efficiency and covers wide range of possible attacks of 
DDoS attacks on ITM. 
Scalability : If the detection approach is 
centralized then no need to use additional honeypots to 
the network except the honeypot placed at the data 
center when ever new ITM entered into the private 
region. In the distributed detection approach new 
honeypot is attached whenever the new ITM entered 
into the network. 
When the network increases or new ITMs 
entered into the private region of the network, it does not 
create additional load on the existing data center. The 
GT approach handles the input traffic without depends 
on the number of ITMs or the data centers in the 
network. 
Load Sharing : Every honeypot has its own 
capacity of handling the load or traffic in the network. In 
the centralized detection approach if the traffic exceeds 
its capacity, then the total detection system is vanished. 
The same problem occurs in case of distributed 
detection approach also. 
If the load in the network increases then the GT 
approach forms more number of input pools and the 
tests are applied on the pools repeatedly to perform the 
attack detection. 
False positives and false negatives: In the 
honeypot based flooding detection false positives and 
false negatives are not explicitly considered. The 
detection process finds the root of the attack, by 
blocking the IRC server. 
In GT approach the false positives and false 
negatives calculated explicitly by conducting specific 
tests on the input pools of the traffic. False positives and 
false negatives improve the detection process in terms 
of considering the attack traffic as genuine and vice-
versa. 
c) Attack detection using Group testing approach 
In the detection model[17], each testing pool is 
mapped to a virtual server within a back-end server 
machine. Although the maximum number of virtual 
servers can be extremely huge, since each virtual server 
requires enough service resources to manage client 
requests, it is practical to have the virtual server quantity 
Modeling and Counter Measures of Flooding Attacks to Internet Threat Monitors (ITM): Using Botnet 
and Group-Testing approach
©  2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
 V
ol
um
e 
X
I 
Is
su
e 
X
X
I 
 V
er
si
on
 I
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  22
20
11
D
ec
em
be
r
Limitations of Honeypot detection
(maximum number of servers) and capacity (maximum 
number of clients that can be handled in parallel) 
constrained by two input parameters K and w, 
respectively.  
The maximum number of attackers d is 
assumed known beforehand. Scenarios with 
nondeterministic d are out of the scope of this paper. In 
fact, these scenarios can be readily handled by first 
testing with an estimated d, then increasing d if exactly d 
positive items are found. 
Each back-end server works as an independent 
testing domain, where all virtual servers within it serve as 
testing pools. In the following sections, we only discuss 
the operations within one backend server, and it is 
similar in any other servers. The detection consists of 
multiple testing rounds, and each round can be 
sketched in four stages. 
First, generate and update matrix M for testing.  
Second, “assign” clients to virtual servers based 
on M. The back-end server maps each client into one 
distinct column in M and distributes an encrypted token 
queue to it. Each token in the token queue corresponds 
to a 1-entry in the mapped column, i.e., client j receives 
a token with destination virtual server i iff M[i,j]= 1. 
Being piggybacked with one token, each request is 
forwarded to a virtual server by the virtual switch. In 
addition, requests are validated on arriving at the 
physical servers for faked tokens or identified malice ID. 
This procedure ensures that all the client requests are 
distributed exactly as how the matrix M regulates and 
prevents any attackers from accessing the virtual 
servers other than the ones assigned to them. 
Third, all the servers are monitored for their 
service resource usage periodically, specifically, the 
arriving  request aggregate (the total number of 
incoming requests) and average response time of each 
virtual server are recorded and compared with some 
dynamic thresholds to be shown later. All virtual servers 
are associated with positive or negative outcomes 
accordingly. 
Fourth, decode these outcomes and identify 
legitimate or malicious IDs. By following the detection 
algorithms  all the attackers can be identified within 
several testing rounds. To lower the overhead and delay 
introduced by the mapping and piggybacking for each 
request, the system is exempted from this procedure in 
normal service state. As shown in Fig. 3, the back-end 
server cycles between two states, which we refer as 
NORMAL mode and DANGER mode. Once the 
estimated response time (ERT) of any virtual server 
exceeds some profile-based threshold, the whole 
backend server will transfer to the DANGER mode and 
execute the detection scheme. Whenever the average 
response time (ART) of each virtual server falls below 
the threshold, the physical server returns to NORMAL 
mode. 
 
  Fig.3 : Two state Diagram if the system. 
Based on the system framework above, we 
propose three detection algorithms SDP, SDoP, and 
PND
 
in this section. Note that the length of each testing 
round is a predefined constant P; hence, we analyze the 
algorithm complexity in terms of the number of testing 
rounds for simplicity.
 
i.
 
Sequential Detection with Packing
 This algorithm investigates the benefit of classic 
sequential group testing, i.e., optimizing the grouping of 
the subsequent tests by analyzing existing outcomes. 
Similar to traditional sequential testing, each client 
(column) only appears in one testing pool (server) at a 
time. However, to make full use of the available K
 servers, we have all servers conduct test in parallel. 
 
ii.
 
Sequential Detection without Packing
 Considering the potential overload problem 
arises from the “packing” scheme adopted in SDP, we
 propose another ralgorithm where legitimate clients do
not shift to other servers after they are identified. This 
emerges from the observation that legitimate clients 
cannot affect the test outcomes since they are negative. 
 The basic idea of the SDoP
 
algorithm can be
sketched below. Given a suspect IDs set S
 
with initial 
size n, evenly assign them to the K
 
server machines, 
similar to SDP
 
in the first round. For the following 
rounds, assign suspect IDs
 
to the K
 
servers instead of 
|A| available ones. For the identified legitimate IDs, never 
move them until their servers are to be overloaded. In 
this case, reassign all legitimate IDs
 
over the K
 machines to balance the load. For server with positive
outcome, the IDs
 
active on this server but not included 
by the set of identified legitimate ones, i.e., suspect IDs, 
will still be identified as suspect. However, if there is only 
one suspect IDs
 
of this kind in a positive server, this ID
 is certainly an attacker.
 iii.
 
Partial Non adaptive Detection
 Considering the fact that in the two sequential 
algorithms mentioned, we cannot identify any attackers 
until we isolate each of them to a virtual server with 
negative outcome, which may bring up the detection 
latency. In this scenario, the requests from the same 
client will be
 
received and responded by different 
servers in a round-robin manner. Different from SDP
 
and 
SDoP, a d-disjunct matrix is used as the testing matrix in 
this scheme and attackers can be identified without the 
need of isolating them into servers.
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             The attack traffic can be identified by using any 
of the three methods defined and QoS of the system is 
 
completely depends on the number of tests performed, 
number of rounds conducted on the pools .Once the 
attack traffic is identified ,then it is easy to find the attack 
source using the traffic entities. In our paper we focused 
on the flooding based attacks and these are generated 
using the botnet. The attacker floods the target ITM
 
by 
sending the commands through C & C server. Here the 
attack traffic contains the C & C
 
server address, and 
then it is very easy to block or point out that server to 
avoid the flooding attacks on the system.
 
While identifying the attack traffic with GT
 
approach one can remember that the data should not 
be lost; these can be effectively done with false 
positives and negatives. 
 
Despite the number of needed testing rounds 
differs for these three algorithms above, the time 
complexity of calculating each testing round
 
for these 
algorithms is approximate in practice. It is trivial to see 
that the costs for SDP
 
and SDoP
 
are negligible, but not 
for PND
 
algorithm which involves polynomial 
computation on Galois Field. However, considering that 
the upper bound of both the number of clients n and 
attackers d
 
is estimated, the detection system can pre 
compute the d-disjunct matrices for all possible (n, d)
 
pairs offline, and fetch the results in real time. Therefore, 
the overhead can be decreased to O(1)
 
and the client 
requests
 
can be smoothly distributed at the turn of 
testing rounds without suffering from long delays of 
matrix update.
 VII.    CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
 
The frame work integrates active real time 
flooding attack flow identification from botnet with GT
 
approach. The GT
 
approach has been used at Data 
center to detect the attack traffic that interns helpful, 
while identifying the C&C
 
server to block the flooding 
attack against the ITM. The false positive and false 
negatives can be effectively minimized to improve the 
QoS
 
factors of the system.
 
Some of the avenues for further extensions are 
with larger and heterogeneous networks. Back tracking 
can be applied on attack flows to reach the attack 
source. Both of them hold promise for evaluating and 
improving our DDoS
 
detection and defense method and 
data center information protection. The data center load 
can be still minimized by used some distributed load 
sharing algorithms.
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